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Abstract 
The increasing development of offshore wind parks in the European offshore territory may lead to 
meshed offshore grids in which each wind park might be connected to several countries. Such 
offshore grids could be subject to various regulatory regimes, depending on the degree of 
cooperation between the respective countries. This study focuses on how investors in wind parks 
and transmission systems are affected by the choice of regulatory regime in offshore grids with one 
to four countries connected. In order to capture the uncertainties related to the exposure to market 
prices as well as risks related to line failures, we develop a stochastic model for an exemplary wind 
park and offshore grid. This yields the real option values of operational flexibility from additional 
connections. Simulation results show that the choice of regulatory regime, including market access 
and pricing rules, can have a significant impact on the value of a wind park and on the value of the 
interconnection capacity in the offshore grid. The impact can both be positive and negative, 
implying a complex incentive structure for the involved actors. If contrary effects are not reflected 
in the remuneration level of a wind park, for example in the price premium level, investment 
incentives could either be diminished or the wind park could incur windfall profits. Both cases are 
socio-economically suboptimal as they may pose additional cost to the system. Policy makers 
should consider these findings when designing the regulatory regime and level of support in an 
offshore grid in order to maintain an effective and efficient development of offshore wind in 
Europe. 
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1 Introduction 
Offshore wind energy is one of the cornerstones for achieving a higher share of renewable energy sources 
(RES) in a number of coastal European countries. Until now, the connection of offshore wind parks is 
mainly pursued from a national approach. However, with the increasing number of offshore wind parks in 
the European offshore territory, the interconnection of offshore wind parks in meshed offshore grids with 
simultaneous connection to more than one country is coming more and more into focus. An early example 
is the Kriegers Flak project in the Baltic Sea where Denmark, Germany and possibly Sweden at a later 
stage collaborate on a common offshore node. Similar projects are also under discussion for the Irish Sea 
and for the North Sea. A study on the latter demonstrated that a common connection of offshore wind 
parks as well as further connections between them can lead to large cost savings and extra benefits from 
electricity transmission of up to 21 billion Euro for the North Sea region (deDecker and Kreutzkamp, 
2011). 
An offshore grid would enable a joint system optimisation across wind parks, interconnections and 
electricity markets. This is expected to be of socio-economic benefit, amongst others thanks to 
infrastructure cost reductions, increase in security of supply for all participating countries, enhancement 
of trade between markets, and benefits from an improved market integration of the fluctuating wind 
energy (deDecker and Kreutzkamp, 2011). 
 
Offshore grids could be subject to various regulatory regimes, depending on the preferences as well as the 
degree of cooperation between the participating countries. More specifically, the countries would have to 
agree on the regulation of market access for the interconnected offshore wind parks and would have to 
design the pricing rules. Also the level of cooperation regarding renewable support and in some cases the 
choice of support scheme for the offshore area are to be considered. 
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Research in the field of offshore grids for wind energy is increasing: beside the aforementioned study by 
deDecker and Kreutzkamp (2011), research is undertaken on technical level, e.g. by Trötscher and Korpås 
(2011) regarding an optimal topology of an offshore network, as well as on regulatory level, where 
Roggenkamp et al. (2010) analyse offshore electricity grids and their potential implementation in respect 
to market and regulatory aspects. Woolley et al. (2012) analyse legal aspects of offshore grids, including 
the cases where an offshore wind park is in addition to its ‘home’ country also connected to one other, 
and where it forms part of a meshed offshore grid. Schröder (2012) shows that participation in national 
balancing markets constitutes a main part of the economic attractiveness of an offshore wind park and that 
an interconnection to several markets will impact the business case. 
 
Most of these analyses deal with offshore grids from a macroscopic perspective. There is however a 
certain lack of understanding as of how the market actors, especially the investors in offshore wind parks 
and transmission systems, are affected by the choice of regulatory regime in an offshore grid. This 
understanding is of utmost importance when designing the regulatory regime in order to ensure adequate 
investment incentives for wind parks and transmission capacity. A step towards this understanding was 
taken in an earlier study by the authors (Schröder and Kitzing, 2012) and is further elaborated in this 
paper. We approach the research gap with a real-options approach: we investigate an offshore wind park 
in an offshore grid under different regulatory regimes and support scheme constellations, and determine 
the option value of operational flexibility for additional interconnections. With the further development 
and extension of the quantitative model, we now address the economic impact of different regulatory 
regimes on the investors and operators of wind parks as well as transmission systems. 
 
Our model shows that there can be both positive and negative effects on the business case of the offshore 
wind park operator. We argue that the specific effects should be considered when choosing the regulatory 
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regime and designing the support scheme in the offshore grid, in order to maintain the effective and 
efficient development of offshore wind in Europe. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: after an explanation of the investigated cases in 
section 2, we address the applied method in section 3. Then we turn to the quantitative results and their 
discussion (sections 4 and 5). The paper concludes with qualitative conclusions and considerations on 
policy options (section 6). 
 
2 Possible regulatory solutions and pricing schemes in offshore grids 
We investigate a fictive offshore wind park in an offshore grid, connected to between one to four 
archetypical European markets, with regard to different regulatory regimes and support scheme 
constellations. We consider two different support schemes: Feed-in tariffs and price premium 
mechanisms. Under Feed-in tariffs (FIT), a fixed remuneration per MWh is guaranteed and paid to the 
wind park operator for a fixed number of years (or generation hours). Selling the generation on power 
markets and correction of forecast errors is typically administered by the TSO, leaving the wind park 
operator with only limited market risk. Price premium mechanisms, or Feed-in premiums (FIP), are 
typically fixed add-on payments to the market price. The wind park operator has to sell the generated 
electricity on power markets and is exposed to both market price risk and forecast errors. 
Since wind farm operators under feed-in tariffs are not exposed to significant market risk, market pricing 
rules do not play a decisive role in the investment decision. In the case of feed-in premium mechanisms, 
operators are exposed to market price signals and market pricing rules for the offshore grid become 
decisive. In extension to our previous analysis, we distinguish three fundamentally different regulatory 
regimes in terms of market access and spot market pricing rules:  
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1) ‘Home’ country: The wind park in the offshore area is assigned to one ‘home’ country and has 
only secondary access to the other connected markets;  
2) ‘Primary access’: the offshore area is flexibly integrated into any of the neighbouring markets, 
so that the wind park operator has access to the respective maximum price;  
3) ‘Offshore hub’: the offshore area forms its own market price area and thus the wind park 
operator is subject to specific nodal pricing. 
 
The first case depicts a situation of limited cross-country coordination, when for example the participating 
countries would like to benefit from the price-equalising effects of additional interconnection capacity 
between the markets, but are not cooperating at a higher level, such as regarding the support scheme. 
Then, an offshore wind farm would be assigned one ‘home’ country into which it would primarily sell the 
power and receive the support. In case the market price in another country happens to be higher than the 
one of the ‘home’ country plus support, the wind park may choose to sell the power in that market. This is 
socio-economically not an optimal utilisation of the interconnection capacity as the price-equalising effect 
will be distorted by the support level. This effect is reflected by lower congestion rents collected by the 
transmission system operators (TSO). 
 
The second and the third cases do allow an optimal utilisation of the interconnection capacity, as we here 
assume a support scheme specific for the offshore area, i.e. the wind park would receive a price premium 
no matter in which market the power is sold. The two cases differ in the pricing rules: In the second case, 
the production from the wind park is integrated in one of the neighbouring markets, and will receive the 
price of the respective market. The choice into which market to sell is left to the wind park operator. He 
will directly sell the produced power into any of the markets via a specifically reserved capacity in the 
interconnectors. The rest of the interconnectors are dispatched in implicit auctions. We refer to this case 
as the ‘primary access’ case.  
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In the third case, the offshore grid becomes an integral part of a larger market area with different price 
nodes (such as the Nord pool area), with implicit auctions on the entire interconnection capacities, and a 
separate price that may form in the offshore grid node in case of congestions. The offshore wind park 
operator will always be subject to the price that forms in the offshore node, which in many cases is equal 
to the lowest or a medium price of the neighbouring markets (Schröder and Sundahl, 2011). We refer to 
this case as the ‘offshore hub’ case with nodal pricing. 
 
The number of countries (and therewith markets) that are participating in the offshore hub with respective 
interconnector capacities are decisive for the attractiveness of investment in an offshore wind park. In the 
benchmark case, only a connection to one market is assumed. We investigate the economic impact on the 
business cases for the wind park and interconnection cables induced by additional connections to other 
markets under all three regulatory regimes. Figure 1 illustrates the different fictive connection situations 
distinguished in this paper: the benchmark case is a 600 MW offshore wind park connected to country A 
by a cable with the same capacity. This connection can be complemented by additional 600 MW 
interconnectors to the neighbouring countries B, C and D.  
 
Figure 1: Overview of connection options in the considered cases 
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In addition to the connections, two other parameters are worth investigating: failure risk of any of the 
connections might impact the business cases significantly, depending on the regulatory set-up. Especially 
relevant for the stochastic analysis and therewith the option value is the strength of price correlation 
between the investigated markets. 
 
The above considerations lead us to the following cases we investigate during the remainder of the paper: 
  
Table 1: Overview of the analysed cases and their main distinguishing characteristics 
 
In order to capture the uncertainties related to the exposure of the offshore wind park to market price 
fluctuations under a price premium scheme and to integrate line failures into our considerations, a 
stochastic model is applied for the quantitative analysis. We use a real-options approach where any 
additional value related to the operational flexibility of being connected to other countries is regarded as 
the option value of the additional interconnection. 
 
3 Method 
Market prices of the different markets are modelled as stochastic mean reverting Wiener processes, 
following well-established methods. Stochastic line failures are reflected by the authors’ own approach, 
inspired by previous modelling of jump processes in commodity prices (see e.g. Hambly et al., 2009). We 
then compare the mean expected value of a wind park and its standard deviation in the different cases of 
regulatory regimes and country-connections to the benchmark case. This benchmark case is a wind park 
Benchmark
Geographical area Country A
Renewable 
Support
Feed-in tariff
Feed in Premium
Applicable
price areas
Country A
Special events -
‘Home’ country case Primary access case Offshore hub case
Countries A + B, C, D
Feed-in Premium 
(in Country A) 
Country A, and
very high prices 
in countries B to D
Line Failures
High market correlations
Special cases
Feed-in Premium 
(joint scheme) 
Highest prices of 
countries A to D
Offshore price node (typically median of 
prices in countries A to D)
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connected to one country only. At the same time, changes in congestion rents obtained by the involved 
TSOs for the different cases are analysed. 
 
3.1 A stochastic model for the value of a wind park under price uncertainty 
We use a well-established and often used approach (based on Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) to develop a 
stochastic model of the spot electricity price in four countries, where electricity prices are a stochastic 
process following a Brownian motion. The stochastic behaviour of prices, including drift and volatility, 
are exogenously given to the model. It has often been shown that most commodities in general and 
electricity prices specifically show characteristics of mean reversion and seasonal patterns (Lucia and 
Schwartz, 2002). Considering the nature of the analysis, which is a comparison of different cases with the 
same underlying market price processes, we include mean reversion in the model, as it will indeed affect 
the results, especially because the cases are sensitive to small price differences between the countries. 
Seasonal patterns however are not expected to modify the comparative attractiveness of the cases 
significantly, as they would apply similarly to all countries. Therefore, seasonal patterns are not included 
in the model. The price processes are modelled as plain mean reverting Wiener processes after Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). The stochastic change of price in each time step    is expressed with the mean reverting 
stochastic process: 
                        (1) 
Where: 
    is a Wiener process with independent increments at 
    –                            
    is the mean reversion factor of the market (exogenously given) 
   is the standard deviation of the market (exogenously given) 
    is the ‘normal’ level of the price   , to which it tends to revert, i.e. the long-run marginal cost of 
production in an electricity system 
 
9 / 27 
The processes are Markovian, meaning that the distribution of future prices is only dependent on the 
present price and not the past history of prices, i.e. it follows fundamental signals. In this framework, the 
price    in each time step can be calculated from the previous price plus the expected change    from a 
stochastic process: 
             (2) 
 
For the simulation, we use the related first-order autoregressive process in discrete time (see Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994, p. 76): 
           
                         (3) 
Where: 
   is the ‘normal’ level of   , to which it tends to revert.    includes a drift in the process and is 
therewith also dependent on   
    is a normally distributed random variable with mean of zero and variance of 
   
  
  
   
           (4) 
 
Having the stochastic price processes for all four countries in place, we then model the hourly expected 
future cashflows of the wind park mainly dependent on revenues from sales into the different spot market 
based on the restrictions given by the different cases we investigate. Next, future cashflows are 
aggregated over the analysis period, i.e. the lifetime of the wind project, and a traditional discounted 
cashflow calculation is undertaken to determine the project value, here expressed as the internal rate of 
return in each scenario and each realisation of the stochastic price process (Brealey and Myers, 2002). 
 
  (5) 
Where: 
IRR is the internal rate of return in each realisation of the price processes in each scenario 
NPV is the net present value of the wind park 
     is net cashflow in period t (net of positive and negative cashflows) 
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    is the time period of the Cashflow 
    is Number of periods, i.e. the lifetime of the wind park  
 
Mean and standard deviation of the net present value of the project for the different cases are determined 
by a Monte Carlo simulation (N=1,000) capturing different realisations of the price processes. 
 
3.2 A model for stochastic line failures 
Stochastic line failures are added as an optional choice to the model. We model the probability of 
occurrence of a line failure with a Poisson distribution     , which reflects the nature of the failures 
much better than e.g. a normal distribution. This modelling approach is comparable to modelling of jump 
processes in commodity prices (see for example Hambly et al., 2009). The probability of duration of the 
line failure is modelled as a normal distribution       . We also add an exponential recovery process for 
the available capacity    when ramping up after the line failure, approaching exponentially to the 
maximum available capacity   , the nominal capacity of the interconnection capacity between the wind 
park and the respective country. 
                             
                 (6) 
Where: 
   is the value of available interconnection capacity, being restricted to          
    is the nominal capacity, i.e. the maximum available interconnection capacity between the wind 
park and the respective country. It also serves here as the jump size in the Poisson process, 
meaning that the failure is expected to affect 100% of the capacity 
  is the recovery rate of the exponential process towards the maximum available capacity    
       is the variable that activates the line failure, with  
          
       
         
  
    is a Poisson distributed random variable with mean of   ,             
    is reflecting the expected number of line failures per year 
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      is the variable that activates the recovery process after an outage, with 
        
          
               
  
     is the maximum value of  , in which a line failure last occurred, with                
    is a normally distributed random variable with mean of zero and standard deviation of  ,  
          
    is reflecting the expected number of hours the outage lasts 
 
3.3 Assumptions 
As described in a previous section, we investigate a fictive case with four archetypical markets and a 
typically sized offshore wind farm of 600 MW. We assume the addition of 600 MW interconnectors to 
other countries as main distinction criterion between the cases. This has a crucial effect on results: the 
capacity of the wind farm is such that typically all its power can be sold into one market. Other capacity 
combinations, especially combined with different electricity price characteristics in the neighbouring 
countries, would most likely have a considerable impact on the results. This issue is dealt with in a 
sensitivity calculation, where we vary the connection capacity. 
 
The electricity price processes for all four countries (see section 3.1) are assumed to share the same fictive 
stochastic parameters. The starting mean value is assumed at 50 Euro/MWh with a drift of +1 Euro/MWh 
towards the end of each year. The volatility is expressed as a standard deviation before mean reversion at 
1.5 Euro/MWh, while the mean reversion coefficient κ is set at 0.01. Markets are non-correlated, except 
for one special case, where the effect of high market correlation is analysed by assuming a correlation of 
0.9 of market A with B, C and D. 
 
Regarding the stochastic line failures (see section 3.2) we assume that on average three annual 
interruptions occur with a normally-distributed duration with expected 50 hours per outage. The line 
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failures are assumed to occur with a Poisson-distributed frequency with a λ of 3. The spike mean 
reversion parameter κ, reflecting the speed of return to nominal capacity after a line outage, is set at 0.05. 
The average failure duration of 150 hours per year corresponds to 1.7% outage per year, which is 
regarded to lie in a realistic range (Lindén et al., 2010 and Waterworth et al., 1998).  
 
Figure 2: Exemplary outage results for the four interconnectors over a full year 
 
The wind time series is based on measured wind data at the FINO1 platform in the South-Western part of 
the German sector of the North Sea for the year 2006. It has been processed into an hourly production 
pattern accordingly to Nørgaard et al. (2004) and approximately adjusted for wake effects. The 600 MW 
offshore wind park is assumed to have a lifetime of 25 years, about 4,475 full load hours, investment cost 
of 2.45 million Euro/MW and operational expenditure of 0.07 million Euro/MW/year. These assumptions 
on the offshore wind park are based on ENS (2010). Apart from the rather high value for full load hours 
derived from wind time series, these numbers are in line with Deloitte (2011) and assessed to be realistic 
for the nearest years to come. 
 
4 Quantitative results 
The quantitative results we obtain and discuss further are different for wind park and transmission system 
operators. For the offshore wind park, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) represents the value of the wind 
park and therewith the investment incentive. We consider the expected mean IRR and the standard 
deviation of the IRR from the Monte Carlo simulations. For the TSO, the income from the 
interconnection operations forms the basis to evaluate the interconnections and therewith the investment 
0
200
400
600
MW
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incentive in additional cables. The TSO collects the income as congestion revenues, also called 
congestion rents, which are income from price differences on the participating spot markets and the 
implicit energy flows between them. We consider the expected annual mean congestion revenues as well 
as their standard deviation derived in the same Monte Carlo simulations as for the wind park. 
 
4.1 One country – benchmark case 
In the benchmark case, the offshore wind park is only connected to one country and is thus fully 
integrated into that one market. In case the wind park receives a guaranteed price in form of a feed-in 
tariff, the wind park is not exposed to the volatility of that market and all Monte Carlo simulations result 
in the same IRR for the wind park (see Figure 3, left). In case of a fixed price premium paid out in 
addition to the market price, the wind park is exposed to the underlying volatility and the Monte Carlo 
simulations yield a normally distributed outcome of the IRR (Figure 3, right). We have designed the cases 
in such way that the expected mean IRRs for feed-in tariffs and premiums are the same in the benchmark 
case, namely 9.8%. The difference in attractiveness of the two cases lies in the different standard 
deviation – The higher the standard deviation, the higher the riskiness of the project. The Feed-in 
premium case yields in a standard deviation of 0.4%-points. This result forms the basis of comparison for 
our further analyses. 
 
Figure 3: Wind park IRR for feed-in tariff support (left) and price premium support (right) 
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The congestion revenues for the TSO are assumed to be zero in the benchmark case, meaning that we 
only consider and compare the additional income generated by the new cross-border connections in the 
offshore hub in the two to four country cases. 
 
4.2 Home country case 
In this case, the offshore wind farm has primary access to its home country – where it is remunerated at 
the market price plus a price premium – and secondary access to the other countries, where it is only 
remunerated at the respective market prices. Quantitative results are depicted in Figure 4 and show that 
the average IRR increases with the number of markets while the standard deviation decreases. The 
average IRR can be increased from 9.8% under the connection to one country up to 10.3% under the 
connection to four countries. The marginal benefit of each additional connection is decreasing. In addition 
to an increase in IRR, the standard deviation, which we use as indication for riskiness of the investment, 
decreases when adding more countries, in our simulations from 0.4%-points in the benchmark case to 
0.32%-points in the four country case. 
 
 
Figure 4: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) in the home country case 
 
Considering congestion rents (Figure 4, right), they increase with each additional connection and exceed 
the level achieved under primary market access by approximately 10 million Euro. The volatility, 
expressed as standard deviation of the congestion rents, increases from 4.3 to 6.3 million Euro when 
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changing from two to three connected countries. Continuing to four connected countries, a further 
increase to 7.5 million Euro can be observed. 
 
4.3 Primary market access 
In cases where primary access is chosen as regulatory framework, the wind park operator has full benefit 
from the additional connections, whereas the TSO can only use the residual capacity. The wind park can 
choose into which market it sells the electricity and can therewith achieve a higher income from choosing 
the highest price at any point in time – the more countries are connected, the higher the value of the wind 
park (see Figure 5, left). 
 
As already shown in Schröder and Kitzing (2012), the option to be connected to different countries 
increases the value of the wind park significantly. The value of the wind park is here expressed as mean 
expected IRR and increases with up to 33% in the four-country case compared to the benchmark case (up 
from 9.8% to 13.0%) when assuming a constant feed-in premium. In addition to an increase in IRR, the 
standard deviation decreases more than in the home country case, in our simulations with up to 42% 
(down from 0.4% to 0.24%). This is due to the fact that the wind park is less exposed to the volatility of 
market prices in one country as it has the option to switch sales to any other country whenever a low price 
period occurs. We conclude that the wind park operator will in this regulatory regime benefit from any 
additional connections: he can expect a higher IRR and at the same time a risk reducing effect. The risk-
reducing effect is increased when taking line failures into account, whereas the expected project value and 
the risk reducing effect is decreased when considering correlation between the market prices of the 
participating markets. In our example, the IRR decreased by 0.6%-points when considering a two-variate 
correlation of all countries with country A. 
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Figure 5: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) in the primary access case 
 
For all interconnector capacity that is not utilised by the wind park operator, the TSO collects congestion 
revenues from price differences in the adjacent markets. Figure 5 shows the expected amounts and 
probability distributions for this income. Compared to the two-country case, the expected income 
increases with 119% in our simulations (+58 million Euro) when adding one more country, and yet 
another 61 million Euro to 167 million Euro with addition of the fourth country. This is due to the fact 
that in the chosen set-up, single interconnectors have the same capacities and an even number assures a 
better asset utilisation than an odd number of lines. As an example, in periods without wind generation, 
one interconnector can export while another one imports. In a three-country case, this leaves the third 
interconnector idle. In a four-country case, the constellation is symmetrical again. Regarding volatilities, 
it becomes apparent from the simulations that – contrarily to the wind park operator – the TSO faces 
higher volatility in income when more countries are connected to the offshore hub. This is the case for 
markets with no or low correlation, since the additional volatility of each market adds to the overall 
fluctuation in price differences, which is the major income source for congestion rents. In a situation 
where the adjacent markets are highly correlated, both the level of income and the standard deviation 
decrease significantly. 
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4.4 Offshore price hub 
In cases where the regulatory framework constitutes an offshore hub which forms its own price area, the 
wind park operator will not be able to choose on which market to sell his production. The offshore wind 
park will be subject to the price that forms in the offshore hub. This price is dependent on the price levels 
and price differences in the neighbouring markets as well as the overall available interconnection 
capacity. The flow in the connections from the wind park and the different countries is determined in 
implicit auctions. In almost all realistic situations, there will be at least one connection from the wind park 
to a country which is not congested, and the offshore hub price will thus equal the price of that market. 
This will typically not be the highest available price (Schröder and Sundahl, 2011). Therefore, the wind 
park will be valued at a lower level than in the case of primary access. 
 
As was discussed in Schröder and Kitzing (2012), the model results reveal an interesting characteristic of 
how this regulatory framework impacts the wind park under the assumption of identical interconnector 
capacities. When two countries are connected to the offshore price hub, the hub will always form a price 
that corresponds to the lower of the two prices; therefore the impact is very significant with a decrease of 
ca. 15% (from 9.8% to 8.4%). In a case of three countries, the offshore price hub will form a price that 
corresponds to the median of all three prices. Some of the impact of the two-country case is mitigated. In 
a four country case, however a price will form that corresponds to the second lowest of the four market 
prices. In terms of riskiness of the project, i.e. standard deviation, the different country-cases show similar 
distributions as with primary access – a higher number of countries coincides with a lower standard 
deviation. The resulting IRR probability distributions are illustrated in Figure 6. The differences of the 
cases are much less pronounced if there is significant price correlation between the markets of the 
countries especially when including periods of equal prices. 
18 / 27 
 
Figure 6: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) in the offshore hub case 
 
In the case of nodal pricing in an offshore hub, the TSO has access to the full interconnection capacity as 
the production and energy flows from the wind park is integrated in the overall market. Therefore, the 
TSO is able to collect more congestion revenues – the increase is in fact the same amount of revenues that 
the wind park operator loses in the offshore hub regime compared to primary access. The annual revenues 
lie in our simulations for each country-constellation 45-52 million Euros higher than in the primary access 
case. 
 
It can be noted that the two-country case, which is the least attractive for the wind park operator is not the 
best case for the TSO, as the TSO’s revenues increase with addition of more countries simply because 
more energy flow becomes possible. Also, the connection to a fourth country is not beneficial for the 
wind park operator, where it is for the TSO. In these cases, opposing interests of wind park operator and 
TSO could hamper the (further) construction of an offshore hub.  
 
4.5 Special case: line failures 
Line failures are a special case for this analysis, as the loss caused by line outages is a real reduction in 
energy flows between countries. Here again, it is a question of the regulatory framework in who is 
exposed to a potential loss from line failures – the wind park operator or the TSO. If the wind park 
operator is not compensated for line failures of the offshore cables, he bears risk of income loss from not 
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being able to sell the power he produces. Figure 7 shows this situation for connection to one country on 
the left. If the wind park is connected to additional countries (each having similar risk of line failure) and 
has access to any of the other markets, then the wind park is less exposed to income loss the more 
countries are added, because it becomes less probable that all lines fail at the same time. Figure 7 shows 
that the income risk is nearly fully mitigated by four connections. This finding is in line with Macharey et 
al. (2012), who analyse possible interconnections between single German offshore wind clusters and 
conclude that meshed offshore structures can, even within one price zone, have a considerably risk-
reducing effect and be profitable. 
 
  
Figure 7: IRR probability distribution changes for the wind park considering line failures 
 
This result can be of significant impact for the future valuation of wind parks in offshore hubs, especially 
in a regulatory regime with offshore hub pricing – the risk reducing effect on line failures might mitigate 
some of the disincentives for offshore wind park operators in the construction of an offshore hub. 
However, in a regulatory regime where wind park operators are fully or partly compensated for line 
outages, there will be no measurable or only limited impact on the wind park value. Here, the income for 
the TSO will, in addition to the losses from foregone congestion revenues, also be affected from the 
compensation payments for the wind park operator. 
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4.6 Comparison of all cases and sensitivity analysis 
The overall comparison of all cases as illustrated in Figure 8 displays that wind park investors and the 
TSO have opposing preferences in regards to the regulatory regime. The TSO benefits clearly from a 
nodal pricing system in the offshore hub (all ‘offshore hub’ cases (yellow triangles) have the highest 
mean congestion revenues), whereas the wind park operator would prefer a regime with primary market 
access (green squares). Line failures have a much lower impact on cases than a high market price 
correlation (both special cases are connected to their respective reference cases by lines). 
 
 
Figure 8: Overview of all case results for the offshore wind park (left) and the TSO (right) 
 
The difference between primary access and nodal pricing is least pronounced for the three-country case: 
here, the primary access and nodal pricing cases differ only by 41 million Euro on average. The reason is 
a comparatively good case for the wind park under nodal pricing, which is at the expense of congestion 
rent income. This illustrates that option values between several cases are highly dependent on the 
underlying assumptions. 
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A sensitivity analysis for changed line capacities under nodal pricing shows that the wind farm’s IRR 
standard deviation is only affected marginally, whereas the average return increases especially with the 
upgrade to 1,200 MW (Figure 9, left). This is due to the fact that, starting with the benchmark value of 
600 MW for all cables, the connection to one country has been increased in steps of 200 MW until 1,200 
MW. Reaching 1,200 MW, the interconnection corresponds to two other interconnectors leading to a new 
price formation constellation, which explains the major difference to a capacity of 1,000 MW. Regarding 
the congestion rents (Figure 9, right), the result fits with the expectation that additional interconnection 
yields decreasing marginal benefits. 
 
 
Figure 9: Wind farm IRR (left) and TSO congestion rents (right) for changed line capacities 
 
5 Analysis and discussion 
The investigated cases do not represent real conditions in terms of markets or technical options, but they 
carry some pure and archetypical characteristics of conditions for potential offshore grids in the European 
offshore territory. Therewith, they can serve as basis for the main points we wish to highlight. The results 
from the simulations show that the choice of regulatory regime has a decisive impact on the value of a 
wind park investment as well as for the income for transmission system operators. The impact can be both 
positive and negative for the different actors. Overall, we observe that the choice of regulatory regime in 
comparable cases, i.e. the primary access and the offshore hub case (with the same structure of RES 
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support), has a re-allocative effect of benefits between the actors rather than creation of additional 
benefits. As long as connection capacities and market prices do not change between the cases, the 
aggregated benefits including the sale of wind power production and price differences between markets 
are the same. In case of primary access, more of the benefits are allocated to the wind park operators, and 
in the offshore hub with nodal pricing, more income is allocated to the TSO. Both regimes are feasible – 
it is a policy choice which regime should be implemented. In this regard, some considerations should be 
made. 
First, offshore wind park are and will for the near future be dependent on financial support by specific 
instruments such as Feed-in tariffs of Feed-in premiums. If a regulatory regime is chosen that exposes the 
investor in offshore wind parks to market risk and at the same time to nodal pricing in the offshore hub, 
there is a significant risk of lower IRR when additional countries are added to the offshore hub. The 
attractiveness of investment is consequently decreased. In order to trigger an adequate amount of 
investment, the level of support needs to be increased. The higher support level could be paid from the 
additional congestion rents that the TSO incurs. By contrast, if a primary access regime is established, the 
wind park operator could benefit from significant windfall profits when additional countries connect into 
the offshore grid. To avoid socio-economically overly expensive support mechanisms, the level of 
support should be corrected downwards for each new country in the offshore grid. 
Second, the level of cooperation between the countries needs to be taken into consideration. It will not 
always be possible to create an offshore hub with nodal pricing due to the high level of coordination. If 
one country has a well-established national Feed-in tariff system, only a strong ‘home’ country affiliation 
seems to be practically possible. However, an offshore hub regime with nodal pricing could especially 
become interesting for internationally coordinated support schemes in the future to ensure neutrality 
between the neighbouring countries (see Schröder et al., 2011).  
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In addition, the sensitivity analysis on interconnector capacities to different markets shows that 
quantitative results exhibit remarkable differences if the connection to one country reaches an integer 
multiple capacity of the capacities towards other countries. It should be emphasised that this also depends 
on the assumed generation time series and capacities. 
 
We have limited our analysis to spot markets. In reality, balancing markets and their prices might be a 
very decisive factor in choosing on which market to sell. The cases and countries investigated do not 
represent a realistic market environment. Before drawing conclusions on real-world cases, the model 
should be calibrated to real market characteristics; especially the level and volatility of the markets are 
decisive. This, however, could first be applied for a real-world case where the interconnector capacities 
and market price characteristics are known and where the offshore node’s generation is handled 
differently than national onshore generation. A main simplification is that we look at real option values 
for the whole lifetime of the project. This supports transparency, but would probably not apply in real-
world cases: additional interconnectors are first decided upon after the offshore wind farm comes into 
operation. So, for more realistic cases, a sensitivity analysis on additional interconnectors only after a 
certain number of years would provide valuable insights. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper presents an analysis on the economic effects of different regulatory regimes on offshore wind 
parks and transmission system operators in an offshore grid. Stochastic price processes and line failures 
are modelled for four spot markets. An offshore wind farm as part of a meshed offshore grid is connected 
to between one and four of these markets, experiencing different option values of additional 
interconnectors. 
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The analysis reveals two major insights: First, we have shown that the regulatory regime, including 
market access and pricing rules, has a significant impact on the valuation of assets in an offshore hub, 
both wind parks and interconnection capacity. The choice of regulatory regime can have both positive and 
negative impact on the actors. In our (fictive) case with connections to four similar archetypical power 
markets, the IRR for an investment in a wind park increases with up to 33% if the wind park has primary 
access to all markets. Contrarily, establishing an offshore hub with nodal pricing can have a negative 
impact on the IRR of up to 15%. So, the incorporation into an offshore grid is far from neutral for an 
offshore wind park. This leads to the question of how to compensate for possible losses or gains under the 
suggested regulatory mechanisms. Our results show this may need to be handled on an interconnector-by-
interconnector basis: while the connection to a third country is beneficial for the offshore wind park under 
nodal pricing, the connection to a fourth country is negative. 
 
Second, the incentives for the different market actors in relation to additional connections are very 
different and in some cases even contrary. This is particularly visible for the offshore price hub, where the 
wind farm’s profit increases or decreases depending on the number of the connection to be made. It can 
contrarily still be a good business case to add a cable that is negative from the wind farm’s point of view. 
Thus, the market actors such as transmission system operators and wind farm operators may take very 
different positions towards establishing new connections at different stages in the development of meshed 
offshore grids – which may hamper the construction of new lines that are beneficial from a socio-
economic perspective. Both effects should be considered in future valuations of wind parks and offshore 
hubs as well as in the design of the regulatory regime for the offshore grid and the level of support for the 
wind park. Only then, an effective and efficient development of offshore wind in Europe can be achieved.  
 
The sensitivity analyses that we have undertaken regarding different interconnection capacities shows that 
minor upgrades for single interconnectors improve the wind farm’s income only marginally. A larger 
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improvement is reached when a capacity corresponding to existing capacities (600 MW in the example) is 
added. As expected, the marginal benefit of additional capacity decreases from a TSO point of view. 
 
Our results can be used when considering how to design a cross-border offshore hub, such as envisaged in 
the Kriegers Flak area, to make an informed decision. In order to balance incentives for investment and 
socio-economic efficiency, the support level, i.e. in our case the fixed price premium, could be adjusted 
according to changes in wind park value and riskiness. 
 
The attractiveness of offshore grids for different market actors depends heavily on the choice of 
regulatory regime, including market access, pricing rules and support. Certain constellations of regulatory 
regimes create barriers that may hamper the development of offshore grids due to diverging incentives. If 
meshed offshore grids are to be built due to their socio-economic benefits, the effects described in this 
study should be taken into consideration when making regulatory choices. 
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